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1. GENERAL BACKGROUND 
 
The Israeli legal system is a unique product of the history of the country during which its 
development was influenced by three legal systems (the Ottoman law, the English common law 
and Jewish law) together with the reforms made by the legislature and judiciary since the 
founding of the State in 1948. However, for practical purposes, the system is most akin to a 
common law system1 with two main differences, of which one is relevant in the context of child 
abduction. The Ottoman system of according extensive autonomy to religious minorities in 
matters of personal status has continued. Thus, in family law there are two parallel court systems: 
the civil courts which apply secular law and the religious courts of the different communities 
which apply the relevant religious law. The religious courts are subject to judicial review by the 
secular High Court of Justice.2 
 The rules governing the allocation of jurisdiction are complicated often depending on which 
court is first seised of the case and which matters are included expressly or impliedly in the 
application. Custody and access disputes may be decided in either system. However, only the 
civil courts have jurisdiction to decide applications under the 1980 Hague Convention on the 
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (hereafter ‘the 1980 Hague Convention’).3 
Furthermore, religious courts are bound by the Convention to the extent that they are not allowed 
to decide the merits of a custody dispute in relation to a child who has been abducted to Israel 
where an application under the Convention is pending.4 
 The Israeli system has adopted the common law doctrine of binding precedent, but the 
Supreme Court is not bound to follow its previous decisions.5 In cases under the 1980 Hague 
Convention, the courts have emphasised the importance of a unified interpretation of the 
Convention and therefore treat foreign decisions as persuasive precedent.6 
 In the Occupied Territories, the pre-existing law (viz in Judea and Samaria-Jordanian law and 
in Gaza-Egyptian law) continues to apply subject to amendments made by the Israeli Military 
Governor.7 Two cases have considered the question of whether the 1980 Hague Convention 
applies in relation to children abducted to the Occupied Territories. In Eden v Eden,8 the Jewish 
abducting mother was living with the children in a settlement in Gush Katif which is in Gaza. In 
this case, which was decided before the Oslo Accords which set up the Palestinian Authority, it 
was held that the Convention applies to abducted children who are situated in the Occupied 
Territories provided the Israeli court has jurisdiction to decide the case. This condition would 
invariably be fulfilled because jurisdiction is acquired by service of process and regulations allow 
service of process on persons present in the Territories.9 Justice Barak stated that to hold 
otherwise would be to risk turning the Territories, which were under the effective control of Israel 
into a place of refuge for abducting parents. The second case, Plonit v Almonit,10 which was 
decided after the Oslo Accords, involved a Palestinian family who were living in Spain. After a 
visit to relatives in an Arab village situated in Area C of the Occupied Territories, the mother 
refused to return the children to Spain. The court held that since Area C continued to be under 
Israeli administrative control, the 1980 Hague Convention continued to apply in relation to 
abducted children situated in this area. Whilst the court did not say so expressly, the clear 
implication of the decision is that the Convention will not apply to abducted children situated in 
Areas A and B which are under the administrative control of the Palestinian Authority. 
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1.1 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION 
 
The 1980 Hague Convention is the first family law Convention to which Israel has become a 
party. The Convention was signed by Israel on 3 July 1990, ratified on 4 August 1991 and came 
into force on 1 December 1991. Israel was the 22nd Contracting State (the 18th to ratify but with 
four other States, Belize, Hungary, Mexico and New Zealand having previously acceded).11 The 
Convention was implemented in Israel by The Hague Convention (Return of Abducted Children) 
Law 1991 (hereinafter ‘the Hague Convention Law’).12 Section 2 of The Hague Convention Law 
provides that the provisions of the Convention which appear in the appendix thereto (Articles 1 – 
32 without the Preamble) in Hebrew translation will have the force of law and take precedence 
over all other laws. In 1995, Regulations were enacted governing the procedural aspects of 
applications under the Abduction Convention. These Regulations were added as a new chapter 
(numbered 22(1)) to the Civil Procedure Regulations 1984 (hereinafter all references to 
regulations are to the Civil Procedure Regulations unless otherwise stated). 
 
1.2 OTHER CONTRACTING STATES ACCEPTED BY ISRAEL 
 
Section 3 of the Hague Convention Law requires the Foreign Minister to publish in the official 
legal gazette Reshumot notice of the countries in respect of which the Convention is in force with 
Israel. Israel has a policy of accepting all accessions and as of 1 January 2005 had accepted all 
accessions except that of the Dominican Republic. 
 For a full list of all States with which the Convention is in force with Israel, and the dates that 
the Convention entered into force for the relevant States, see the Appendix. 
 
1.3 BILATERAL AGREEMENTS WITH NON-CONVENTION STATES 
 
Israel does not have any bilateral agreements concerning child abduction with non-Convention 
States nor have there been any attempts to do so. No mechanism exists for securing the return of 
children abducted from Israel to such countries,13 although the Central Authority, whilst not 
officially responsible for such cases, will provide assistance in locating a lawyer and liaise with 
foreign authorities. 
 Where children are abducted to Israel from non-Convention states, the left-behind parent may 
obtain a habeas corpus order from the Israeli courts ordering the abductor to release the child. 
Whilst this remedy is discretionary, the policy of the Israeli courts is to grant such an order where 
there has been a breach of the custody rights of the left-behind parent unless it is shown that the 
granting of the order will cause real and irrevocable harm to the child.14 
 
1.4 CONVENTION NOT APPLICABLE IN INTERNAL ABDUCTIONS 
 
Abductions within Israel are not covered by the Convention. There are no specific civil law 
provisions dealing with abductions. Thus, the remedy of the left-behind parent is to request 
interim physical custody (where there is no custody order in force) or to request the enforcement 
of the custody order (where the abduction is in breach of such an order).15 Abduction within Israel 
is a criminal offence.16 
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2. THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL BODIES 
DESIGNATED UNDER THE CONVENTION 
 
2.1 CENTRAL AUTHORITY 
 
Section 4(a) of the Hague Convention Law provides that the Attorney General is the Central 
Authority for the purposes of the Convention. The Attorney General appointed the International 
Department in the State Attorney’s Office (which is situated within the Ministry of Justice) to 
perform the duties of the Central Authority. Within this Department there are two experienced 
attorneys who work on Hague Abduction Convention cases17 under the supervision of the Head of 
the International Department. The contact details of the Central Authority are: 
 
 International Department 
 Ministry of Justice 
 PO Box 49029 
 Jerusalem 91490 
 Israel 
 Tel: +972 (2) 646 6797 / 646 6328 
 Fax: +972 (2) 628 7668 
 Email: lesliek@justice.gov.il and reginat@justice.gov.il 
 Web site: http://www.justice.gov.il 
 
2.2 COURTS AND JUDGES EMPOWERED TO HEAR CONVENTION CASES 
 
The Supreme Court 
↑ 
The District Court 
↑ 
The Family Court 
 
 The Israeli court system is three tier. At the lowest level is the Magistrates Court (shalom) 
which hears both civil and criminal cases of lesser importance. The Family Courts Law 1995 
created a specialist family court at the same level as the Magistrates Court. At the second level is 
the District Court which acts both as a first instance court in relation to more important criminal 
and civil cases and as a court of appeal from the magistrates court and other parallel courts. The 
Supreme Court has two functions. It acts as a court of final appeal from the District Court and, 
when sitting as the High Court of Justice, it reviews both administrative and legal decisions for 
lack of constitutionality or non-compliance with the requirements of administrative law.18 
 Section 6 of the Hague Convention Law provides that the Family Court is authorised to 
perform the acts which under the Convention are to be carried out by “the judicial or 
administrative authority.”19 There are ten area Family Courts which are staffed by approximately 
30 judges who sit full-time in the Family Court and receive special training in family law 
matters.20 Local jurisdiction is determined by the area in which the child is situated at the date of 
the commencement of the proceedings.21 Where the precise whereabouts of the child are 
unknown, the Family Court in Tel-Aviv has jurisdiction.22 
 Appeals from the Family Court are to the District Court for the area where the Family Court 
is situated.23 Appeals are heard by three judges, of whom one will be a family law specialist.24 
 Further appeal to the Supreme Court in Jerusalem requires leave,25 which is given where the 
court considers that the case involves a legal question of general importance or has implications 
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beyond the specific circumstances of the case at hand.26 Appeals to the Supreme Court are heard 
by three judges.27 The President of the Supreme Court may grant leave for a further hearing 
before an extended Bench of at least five Supreme Court judges, where in view of the importance, 
difficulty or novelty of a rule laid down in the matter, there is in his opinion room for a further 
hearing.28 
 
3. OPERATING THE CONVENTION – 
INCOMING APPLICATIONS FOR RETURN 
 
3.1 LOCATING THE CHILD 
 
In 2003, the Israeli Police decided to appoint a liaison officer who receives all complaints about 
children who have been abducted and are thought to be in Israel. This officer then passes on the 
information to the police authorities in the district(s) where the child is likely to be found. 
 Methods of locating the child include searching Ministry of Education records of school 
registration and National Insurance Institute records. However, where the family does not appear 
in such records and there are no other clues to the child’s whereabouts, it can be very difficult and 
sometimes impossible to find the child. 
 
3.2 CENTRAL AUTHORITY PROCEDURE29 
 
Israel has not made a reservation to Article 24 of the Convention and thus applications may be 
submitted in English or French as well as, of course, in Hebrew. There are no specific forms to be 
completed.30 
 The lawyers at the Central Authority check each application to ensure that the requirements 
of the Convention are met and clarify any points which are not clear. 
 The Israeli Central Authority then sends a letter to the Central Authority in the country of 
origin explaining that a lawyer needs to be instructed for the purpose of submitting an application 
for return of the child to the court together with a list of lawyers who have experience in 
Convention cases. 
 The Central Authority will send to the abductor a so-called “voluntary return” letter in cases 
which seem appropriate with the consent of the left-behind parent. This consent is necessary as 
the letter may cause the abductor to flee. The letter gives the abductor two weeks in which to 
respond before steps are taken to initiate proceedings. Where the abductor indicates a willingness 
to return, the Central Authority will help in finalising the details, but does not get involved in 
negotiations involving other disputes between the parties (e.g. money or property). All voluntary 
returns have been successfully enforced. 
 The Central Authority is careful to explain that it does not represent either of the parties, but 
rather provides information and liaises between the various institutions involved in the legal 
proceedings or with the welfare of the child. 
 Once the lawyer has been instructed, the Central Authority will follow the progress of the 
case and try to prevent any delays. For example, the Authority may contact a judge who has not 
scheduled a hearing or given a decision on time (see details of time deadlines post at 3.5). 
 The Central Authority is often requested by the court to provide a legal opinion about the 
interpretation of the 1980 Hague Convention or its implementation in Israel.31 This, of course, 
does not make the Central Authority a party to the case. 
 The Central Authority may also be involved in trying to solve technical problems which may 
prevent a return order being made. For example, in a number of cases of abductions by Israelis 
from the USA, the abductor does not have any right to enter the USA and thus unless a visa is 
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granted he or she will not be able to return with the child. After considerable difficulties, visas 
have eventually been obtained in these cases. 
 
3.3 LEGAL REPRESENTATION 
 
Applicants in Convention cases in Israel are represented by private lawyers (but see legal aid post 
at 3.4). Any lawyer may be used, but most applicants will choose a lawyer from the Central 
Authority’s list (which is also available on the Ministry of Justice web site 
(http://www.justice.gov.il)). At present 36 lawyers appear on this list. In fact, any lawyer who so 
requests, is placed on the list and the Central Authority states that inclusion on the list does not 
constitute an endorsement or recommendation by them and that it does not take any responsibility 
for the professional integrity of the lawyers. 
 Where the left-behind parent applies directly to the court, under Article 29 of the Convention, 
the Central Authority will monitor the case as soon as it becomes aware of its existence either 
through the lawyer acting for the applicant or through the court.32 
 
3.4 COSTS AND LEGAL AID
 
Israel made a reservation to Article 2633 concerning costs in Convention proceedings.34 However, 
in practice, applicants who can prove by means of a certificate of entitlement that they qualify for 
legal aid in their own country are entitled to legal aid in Israel. This means that they will be 
represented free of charge by private lawyers under the auspices of the Legal Aid Unit of the 
Ministry of Justice. 
 The Regulations provide that no form of guarantee or surety for costs should be demanded in 
Hague Convention cases.35 Similarly, no court fee nor execution of judgment fee is charged.36 
Where a return is ordered, the court is authorised to impose on the respondent the costs of the 
applicant including travel expenses, costs in locating the child, legal fees and costs involved in 
the return of the child.37 Courts usually make use of this authority and abductors are required to 
pay substantial sums. 
 
3.5 LEGAL PROCEEDINGS 
 
The application to the court for return of the child or enforcement of access rights has to be 
submitted on a specific form accompanied by specific documents.38 The form requests personal 
details about the parents and the child (e.g. date of birth, nationality, habitual residence, 
occupation, passport number), details as to (a) the removal or retention or denial of access rights, 
(b) of other pending proceedings in relation to the child and (c) of the relief sought. 
 The documents to be attached are: (1) any authenticated decision or agreement evidencing the 
applicant’s right to custody of the child, (2) any other document establishing the application 
including a certificate as to the law applicable in the country of habitual residence and (3) an 
affidavit from any person who, in the applicant’s opinion, is a necessary witness.39 All documents 
submitted to the court have to be in Hebrew or be accompanied by a Hebrew translation,40 but 
authentication is not required unless specifically stated in the regulations.41 
 Failure to attach any of the documents will not prevent the court from hearing the case, but 
the court may take the lack of documentation into account.42 
 When submitting the application, the applicant may request the following ex parte relief: 43 (1) 
an injunction forbidding the child or the person holding him from leaving the country; (2) an 
order forbidding the child from leaving a specific place; (3) an order requesting deposit of the 
child’s passport (or a passport on which he is included); (4) an order instructing the police to (a) 
investigate the abduction, (b) locate the child or (c) help the welfare officer bring the child before 
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the court; (5) an order instructing other judicial or administrative authorities not to hear the matter 
(in accordance with Article 16 of the Convention) and / or (6) any other order which will prevent 
further damage to the child or to the rights of the parties or which will ensure voluntary return of 
the child or otherwise resolve the dispute peaceably.44 
 The Regulations provide that the hearing should take place no later than 15 days after the 
submission of the application to the court.45 
 Notice of the date of the hearing, a copy of the application and any interim relief ordered by 
the court must be served on the respondent as soon as possible after the hearing date is fixed. The 
reply of the respondent must be submitted to the court and the applicant at least two days before 
the date of the hearing.46 
 The Regulations attempt to minimise the delay caused by the giving of oral evidence by 
restricting the situations in which such evidence may be heard. Thus, a party may request an oral 
hearing either to cross-examine a witness who swore an affidavit for the other party or to examine 
a witness who could not give his evidence by affidavit.47 However, the court may refuse these 
requests where in its view there is no necessity for the hearing of the evidence or the witness is 
not available for immediate examination.48 The court itself may only summons a witness for 
examination if there are special reasons which must be recorded.49 The Regulations provide that 
any oral hearing of evidence and examination of witnesses should take place no later than five 
days after the first hearing.50 
 The courts’ practice in relation to the necessity for the applicant to appear for the purpose of 
examination does not seem to be consistent. On the one hand, it has been held that, as a result of 
Article 23 of the Convention which provides that authentication and similar formalities should 
not be insisted on, the usual requirement of being available to be examined on the affidavit should 
not be enforced.51 Similarly, in a case where the applicant was abroad, it was held that the 
abductor would be heard first before deciding if it were necessary to examine the applicant in 
person.52 However, in one case it was held that lack of availability to be examined may reduce the 
weight placed on the affidavit53 and in another that the applicant’s factual claims could not be 
accepted without examination in court.54 
 Before making a decision, the court may require the applicant to produce evidence from the 
authorities of the State of habitual residence confirming that the removal or retention was not 
lawful in accordance with Article 3 of the Convention.55 Such a request will be made where, for 
example, the abductor appears to have sole custody.56 However, the court may be content to rely 
on foreign statutes and case-law57 or an opinion by an expert in the foreign law.58 In one case, it 
was held that where there is no proof of the foreign law in relation to custody rights, the court 
may rely on the presumption of identity of laws and thus apply the Israeli law which gives both 
parents custody rights unless and until there is an agreement or court order to the contrary.59 
 Where the respondent claims that return of the child will expose him to harm within Article 
13(1)(b) or that a return would breach the principles set out in Article 20, the Regulations require 
that he must bring clear and convincing evidence to support his claim and the court may request 
additional evidence.60 In practice, wherever the abductor raises a “defence” under Article 13(1)(b) 
(grave risk of harm) or Article 13(2) (child’s objections), the court will order an expert opinion of 
a psychologist or psychiatrist. The raising of these defences inevitably leads to delays, although 
judges make attempts to minimise these as far as possible. 
 The courts impose a very high burden of proof on an abductor who raises these defences and 
the Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that both these exceptions are to be interpreted very 
narrowly.61 
 Of particular interest is the provision in the Regulations concerning hearing the abducted 
child. It is provided that where the child is of an age and maturity that it is appropriate to take into 
account his view, the court may not decide the case until the judge has heard the child unless the 
court does not see any necessity for this for special reasons, which must be recorded.62 Thus, the 
judge is required to see the child in person and listen to his views. Where there is evidence that 
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the child objects, the court will usually request a report from a welfare officer. This is in addition 
to the judge’s hearing the child in person. Whilst the court has the power to order separate 
representation of the child where in its view this is necessary to prevent harm to the child’s 
interests,63 such representation is very rarely ordered. 
 The Regulations do not mention the exceptions in Article 13(a) of the Convention. 
Acquiescence is fairly frequently pleaded, but this defence is also interpreted narrowly.64 
 The court may, but does not usually, give an order for the return of the child to his place of 
habitual residence immediately at the end of the hearing.65 Even if the respondent does not 
appear, such an order may be made provided that notice of the hearing was served on him. In any 
event, a reasoned decision must be given no later than six weeks from the date of submission of 
the application to the court.66 However, in practice it seems that judges do not adhere to this 
deadline,67 although they do sometimes refer to it in rejecting a request to bring witnesses for 
examination or for adjournment to allow for evidence to be brought from abroad.68 There are also 
examples of appeal court judges criticising the admission of evidence which delayed the 
proceedings at first instance.69 
 Israeli judges commonly attach conditions to return orders such as (1) an undertaking by the 
applicant not to initiate criminal proceedings against the returning abductor,70 (2) agreement by 
the applicant that the abductor should have temporary custody,71 (3) deposit by the applicants of 
sums to cover the initial maintenance of the returning child and parent72 and (4) undertaking not 
to have contact with the returning child and parent without authorisation of the court in the 
country of origin.73 
 
3.6 APPEALS 
 
An appeal against a decision in Convention proceedings must be submitted within seven days of 
the date of the decision.74  The appeal must then be heard no later than ten days after the 
submission of the appeal and the decision must be given no later than 30 days after such date.75  
The reasons for the high rate of appeals (55% in 1999)76 would seem to be the ease of appeal to 
the District Court (which is basically a court of first instance) and the importance of children in 
Israeli culture.77 
 The reported case-law shows that a short stay of execution pending the submission is often 
granted.78 However, it seems that after the appeal is submitted, the appeal court will often, 
although not automatically, grant a further stay of execution79 unless there is thought to be no 
substance in the appeal.80 In such cases, the stay may be conditional upon the child being 
transferred to the requesting parent in Israel until the appeal is heard.81 
 
3.7 ENFORCEMENT OF ORDERS 
 
When making a return order, the court gives instructions for enforcement of the order including 
instructions to the welfare officer and the police. The order is executable immediately upon being 
pronounced and can be enforced by the police and welfare authorities without the necessity for 
any other proceedings, although it will usually be necessary to apply for the lifting of an 
injunction preventing departure from the country shortly before the scheduled departure date. 
 The Central Authority is involved in liaising with the Central Authority in the requesting 
State in connection with the travel arrangements. Where there is thought to be a risk that the 
abductor will make an attempt to avoid returning, the Central Authority will coordinate 
enforcement with the police and welfare authorities. This usually involves accompaniment of the 
child and abductor onto the plane by a welfare officer and / or officers of the border police. 
 There have been few problems with enforcement.82 In one case,83 where the parties were 
Palestinians living in Spain and the mother had retained the child in an Arab village in the 
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Occupied Territories, the order was enforced by police interception of the car taking the children 
to school outside their village.84 
 Where return is conditional upon undertakings which have to be performed before return and 
the left-behind parent does not comply with these undertakings, execution of the order may be 
delayed until there is full-compliance.85 
 
4. OPERATING THE CONVENTION – 
INCOMING APPLICATIONS FOR ACCESS 
 
4.1 / 4.2 CENTRAL AUTHORITY PROCEDURE86 AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS 
 
When the Central Authority receives a request for access they act in the same manner as with 
requests for return. In other words they will provide information about legal representation, 
monitor the progress of the case and provide any information necessary in the course of the 
proceedings. 
 On the few occasions that 1980 Hague Convention access cases have reached the courts,87 the 
judges explained that Article 21 of the Convention in combination with relevant provisions of the 
Israeli Civil Procedure Regulations afforded the applicant procedural benefits in seeking to 
enforce a foreign access judgment, but did not themselves provide any right to enforcement of the 
judgment.88 
 Indeed, the Civil Procedure Regulations provide that all the regulations relating to 
applications for return apply mutatis mutandis to applications to enforce access.89 Thus, for 
example, the application will benefit from the exemption from providing security for costs, the 
time deadlines and the relaxation of the rules from proving foreign law and recognizing foreign 
judgments. However, as one judge pointed out,90 the Regulations do not contain any mechanism 
for making or enforcing access orders. 
 The Israeli court will not enforce or modify a foreign access order without checking that it is 
consistent with the welfare of the child as required by the Legal Capacity and Guardianship Law 
1964. This is effectively the same as making a fresh access order. 
 Thus, unless there will be entitlement to legal aid under the Convention, there is little 
incentive to apply for access under the Convention rather than applying directly. This probably 
explains why there are so few applications under the Convention (see the statistics post at 7). 
 
4.3 ENFORCEMENT OF ORDERS 
 
If an access order is not complied with, there are in theory a number of possible remedies 
available. Some of them may be applied for directly by the aggrieved parent, whilst others require 
institution of proceedings by public authorities. As will be seen, all the remedies involve an 
element of discretion, which reduces the likelihood of effective enforcement. 
 
(a) Civil Contempt of Court (Section 6 of the Contempt of Court Ordinance) 
 
 If the court is satisfied that there has been a breach of the order, it may issue a further order 
requiring the breach to be remedied and specifying the sanction for failure to remedy. The 
purpose of the sanction, which will be a fine and / or imprisonment, is to cause compliance with 
the court order and is not intended to be punitive. 
 A recent illustration of use of this remedy is A.B.M. v A.E.91 In this case the mother had 
relocated to Israel with the children with the consent of the court in California, where the family 
had lived previously. When the mother refused to allow the father to visit the child in accordance 
with the order of the Californian court, the father applied to the Israeli court to enforce his access 
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rights under the 1980 Hague Abduction Convention. In the course of these proceedings, the 
parties came to agreement about the access arrangements, which were then included in a court 
order. When the mother failed to comply with these arrangements, the father requested that 
sanctions be imposed on the mother under the Contempt of Court Ordinance. Accepting this 
request, the court ordered that the mother pay a fine of 1,500 shekels (approximately $350) for 
further breach of the access arrangements contained in the court order. 
 However, in practice most judges are reluctant to use such sanctions and will simply warn the 
offending party. 
 
(b)  Execution of the Order (section 62 of the Execution Law 1967) 
 
 Under this provision, an order for the handing over of a child or an order providing for a 
parent to have access to a child may be enforced by the Execution of Judgments Agency where 
the court has stated that the order should be so enforced. The court officer charged with executing 
the order must request the assistance of the welfare officer. Furthermore, the provision expressly 
states that where the officer charged with executing the order decides that the order can only be 
executed by the use of force against the child and the child is capable of understanding the matter, 
or there are other difficulties in executing the order, the case may be referred back to the court for 
further instructions. 
 Case-law goes further and requires the Head of the Execution of Judgments Agency not to 
enforce the judgment against the wishes of the child unless he is convinced or the court has 
specifically held that the child’s welfare requires forcible execution of the judgment.92 No case 
has been found where a court has authorised execution against the child’s wishes. 
 
(c) Criminal Contempt of Court (section 287 of the Penal Code 1977) 
 
 Under s 287 of the Penal Code, a person who is in breach of an order given by a court is 
guilty of a criminal offence for which he may be sentenced to up to two years imprisonment. 
Liability will only be imposed under this section where no other punishment or procedure has 
been fixed in relation to the breach in question. 
 In Greenburg v State of Israel,93 an injunction had been issued against the mother ordering 
her not to prevent the father taking their daughter for an outing at the time specified. When the 
mother broke this injunction, she was sentenced to three months imprisonment suspended for two 
years. She appealed contending that the matter should have been dealt with under the Contempt 
of Court Ordinance and that this constituted another procedure. Her appeal was rejected on the 
basis that each time the mother prevented the realisation of the father’s access rights constituted a 
separate breach of the court order. The sanctions available under the Contempt of Court 
Ordinance only applied to future breaches and did not constitute a punishment for past breaches 
which could not be remedied. Thus, there was no other procedure in relation to past breaches and 
the conviction was upheld.94 
 Criminal prosecutions may only be instituted by the State. This is rarely done inter alia 
because in many cases prosecution may be harmful to the child. 
 
(d)  Care Order 
 
 Where the welfare officer is of the opinion that the denial of access is causing serious 
irreparable harm to the child, for example where the child is said to be suffering from Parental 
Alienation Syndrome (PAS), he or she may bring proceedings under the Youth Law (Care and 
Supervision) 1960 requesting that the minor be declared “a minor in need of protection.” Where 
such a declaration is made, the court may issue a care order or a supervision order. The effect of a 
care order is to transfer the custody of the child to the welfare authorities who will determine 
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where the child is to reside and what treatment he is to receive. The purpose of such an order in 
these cases is to enable the child to receive psychological counselling which will enable him to 
rebuild his relationship with the alienated parent while living in a neutral environment. Clearly 
such an order is only made as a last resort where all other efforts to resolve the situation have 
failed. 
 Removal of the child from the custodial parent in such circumstances is highly controversial 
and widespread criticism was voiced against a 2003 Supreme Court case confirming the issue of a 
care order in a case of PAS.95 An appeal against this decision was allowed by a majority of the 
Supreme Court in an additional hearing.96 
 
5. OPERATING THE CONVENTION – 
OUTGOING APPLICATIONS FOR RETURN 
 
5.1 PREVENTING THE REMOVAL OF THE CHILD FROM THE JURISDICTION 
 
5.1.1 CIVIL LAW 
 
(a) Injunctions 
 
 A parent who fears that his child will be taken out of the country without his permission may 
request from the court an ex parte injunction preventing departure from Israel. All ports in Israel 
are computerised and it therefore should not be possible to depart without assuming a false 
identity. 
 Such orders are usually granted under s.68 of the Legal Capacity and Guardianship Law 1962 
which authorises the Family Court to take temporary or permanent steps necessary for the 
protection of the minor and the safeguarding of his welfare. Since both parents as natural 
guardians of the child have the right to determine his place of residence and since it is assumed 
that the unilateral removal of the child by one parent damages the child’s welfare, the courts are 
liberal in granting such orders.97 Use of this jurisdiction avoids the need to satisfy the conditions 
for the granting of such injunctions under the Civil Procedure Regulations. 98 
 Where there are proceedings pending between the parties, the decision as to whether to grant 
the order is based on a balance between the interests of the different parties. In particular, the 
court will ask what will be the effect of granting or not granting such an order on the substantive 
issue between the parties. 
 In one case,99 the mother wished to relocate with the child to Guatemala in order to live with 
her new partner and in response the father requested that custody be transferred to him. The trial 
was set for a month’s time, but the mother wanted to take the child to Guatemala for a holiday in 
the interim period. The father applied for an order preventing removal of the child from Israel. 
The court, granting the order, held that such a trip would not only interfere with the father’s 
access rights during that period, but was liable to influence the child’s views about the relocation 
and thereby alter the existing situation. The court did not mention the risk that the child might not 
be returned at the end of the holiday period, although that would seem to be a highly relevant 
factor. 
 
(b) Passports 
 
 In Israel, children need their own passports and cannot be added onto their parents’ passports. 
In order to obtain a passport the minor has to attend the Population Registry at the Interior 
Ministry in person together with one of his parents.100 
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 In principle the powers invested in the parents as guardians of the child, which include the 
right to obtain a passport on behalf of the minor, may only be exercised with the consent of both 
parents.101 However, there is a statutory presumption that each parent agrees to the actions of the 
other unless it is proved to the contrary. Accordingly, where the parents are still married, even if 
they are separated, the Population Registry is entitled to assume that the other parent agrees to the 
granting of the passport unless there is reason to believe to the contrary. Consequently, where one 
parent is concerned that the other may use the passport in order to abduct the child, he or she 
should write to the Population Registry stating clearly that he or she does not consent to his child 
being granted a passport. 
 The fact that the parents have never been married to each other or are divorced will appear on 
the parent’s identity card and no passport can be granted without the express consent of both 
parents or a court order or an agreement between the parents approved by the court providing that 
the parent requesting the passport has sole custody for the purposes of this decision.102 
 
(c) Financial Guarantees 
 
 The obligation to provide financial security for the parent’s obligation to keep the child in 
Israel or to return him to Israel on time may be inserted in custody agreements or in court orders 
to deter abduction. Such security is commonly required when one parent takes the child abroad. 
 The size of the security required by courts depends not only on the financial position of the 
parent who is giving the security, but also on the degree of risk. For example, where the parent 
has previously abducted or tried to abduct the child or where a parent wishes to take a child 
abroad in circumstance in which he stands to gain from not returning, a more substantial sum will 
be ordered.103 
 
5.1.2 CRIMINAL LAW 
 
The Penal Law104 contains two relevant offences which both carry a maximum sentence of 20 
years imprisonment. Under section 373, a person who removes a minor under the age of 16 from 
the custody of his or her guardian without the consent of a guardian commits a criminal offence. 
Under section 370, a person who takes another person outside the borders of the State without the 
permission of that person or his legal representative commits a criminal offence. It is clear that 
both of these offences may be committed by a parent abducting his own child even though this is 
not expressly stated in the statutes. Accordingly, a parent abducting his child abroad without the 
consent of the other parent (where such consent is required) will be guilty of both of these 
offences.105 
 However, in practice, criminal proceedings are rarely brought against a parent for child 
abduction under either section as there is a 1995 directive106 from the State Attorney not to 
prosecute abducting parents unless the abduction involves exceptional circumstances (such as 
violence, moving the child surreptitiously through a variety of countries,107 repeat offences108 and 
keeping the child in hiding).109 
 
5.2 CENTRAL AUTHORITY PROCEDURE 
 
Where a child has been taken out of Israel to another Convention State, the Israeli Central 
Authority will request that the applicant swear an affidavit and provide any relevant 
documentation (such as court orders). This is then sent, with a translation provided by the 
applicant, to the relevant Central Authority in the foreign State. The Israeli Central Authority will 
then follow closely the progress of the case and where necessary send reminders and requests for 
information about developments in the case. The Central Authority will also provide any further 
information required and liaise between the foreign Central Authority and the applicant. 
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5.3 PROTECTION AND ASSISTANCE ON RETURN 
 
The Israeli Central Authority will request details of the travel arrangements from the foreign 
Central Authority. Where there is a stop-over in another country and there is thought to be a risk 
that the returning parent will try to exploit this in order to prevent enforcement, the Central 
Authority will attempt to make arrangements for the parent and child to be accompanied during 
the stop-over. 
 The Central Authority will alert the welfare authorities if there are any child protection issues. 
However, the enforcement of undertakings is primarily the responsibility of the lawyer 
representing the abducting parent. 
 
5.4 COSTS AND LEGAL AID 
 
No legal aid is available for instructing foreign lawyers since the Israeli legal aid system provides 
services and not monetary payments. 
 
6. AWARENESS OF THE CONVENTION 
 
6.1 EDUCATION OF CENTRAL AUTHORITIES, THE JUDICIARY AND PRACTITIONERS 
 
The Israeli Central Authority sends representatives to conferences at The Hague and participates 
in local conferences and continuing education programmes organised by the Family Courts, the 
Israeli Bar and by other organisations.110 
 
6.2 INFORMATION AND SUPPORT PROVIDED TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC 
 
Information and advice to parents can be found on the Central Authority’s web site 
(http://www.justice.gov.il). At present this site is only in Hebrew, but it is in the process of being 
translated into English. 
 The 1980 Hague Convention receives a fair amount of press coverage. In 2004, a four page 
feature on child abduction in the weekend edition of one of the main daily Hebrew newspapers111 
explained the scope of the duty of automatic return and portrayed the Israeli courts as faithful 
adherents to the Convention. The feature included an interview with an abducting mother against 
whom a return order was made. Although the USA Court eventually allowed her to relocate to 
Israel with her son, her advice to women in a similar situation is under no circumstances to resort 
to abduction. 
 
7. THE CONVENTION IN PRACTICE – 
A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF APPLICATIONS IN 1999112 
 
The Central Authority in Israel handled a total of 57 new applications in 1999, making Israel the 
thirteenth busiest Convention jurisdiction in that year.113 
 
Incoming applications for return 19 
Outgoing applications for return 30 
Incoming applications for access 2 
Outgoing applications for access 6 
 
Total number of applications 57 
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 7.1 INCOMING APPLICATIONS FOR RETURN 
 
7.1.1 THE CONTRACTING STATES WHICH MADE THE APPLICATIONS 
 
 Requesting States 
 Number of Applications Percent 
 USA 11 58 
 Netherlands 2 11 
 Canada 1 5 
 Denmark 1 5 
 Finland 1 5 
 France 1 5 
 Italy 1 5 
 Zimbabwe 1 5 
 Total 19 ~100 
 
 Over half of all the return applications came from the USA. This is perhaps not surprising 
given the close connection between the two States. Apart from the USA and the Netherlands no 
other State made more than one application to Israel in 1999. 
 
7.1.2 THE OUTCOMES OF THE APPLICATIONS 
 
Outcome of Application 
 Number Percent 
 Rejection 2 11 
 Voluntary Return 2 11 
 Judicial Return 6 32 
 Judicial Refusal 5 26 
 Withdrawn 3 16 
 Pending 1 5 
 Total 19 ~100 
  
 
 The proportion of cases which resulted in a judicial return, at 32%, is identical to the global 
norm. On the other hand, the proportion of voluntary returns at 11% is below the global norm of 
18%. Combining judicial and voluntary returns, there was an overall return rate of 43% which is 
below the global average of 50%. Of those cases where return was achieved, 75% were judicial 
rather than voluntary. Overall, almost 58% of applications to Israel went to court. Of these, 45% 
ended in a judicial refusal and only 55% in a judicial return. This differs from the global position 
where 74% of applications which went to court resulted in a judicial return. The overall refusal 
rate of 26% is much higher than the global norm of 11%. The proportion of applications which 
were rejected was identical to the global norm of 11%. The number withdrawn at 16% was also 
similar to global norms of 14%. 
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7.1.3 THE TIME BETWEEN APPLICATION AND FINAL CONCLUSION 
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 Timing was available on 5 of the 6 judicial returns, 4 of the 5 judicial refusals and neither of 
the voluntary returns. The chart above, therefore, relates to these cases only. 
 On average it took 76 days from application to outcome in the judicially returned cases. This 
is faster than the global average speed of 107 days though slower than the six week target set for 
EU Member States under the revised Brussels II Regulation.114 Conversely, the judicially refused 
cases took an average time of 229 days, which is considerably slower than the global average 
speed of 147 days. The times given here are for final judicial settlement and include six cases 
which went to appeal. Three of these ended in judicial return. Consequently the average time of 
76 days is relatively fast. Three others ended in judicial refusal. 
 The following table shows the mean, the median, the minimum and the maximum number of 
days from application to final outcome. 
 
Number of Days Taken to Reach Final Outcome 
 Outcome of Application 
 Judicial Judicial 
 Return Refusal 
 Mean 76 229 
 Median 75 164 
 Minimum 43 111 
 Maximum 131 476 
 Number of Cases 5 4 
 
 
 Globally, only 14% of cases going to court were appealed, while in applications to Israel this 
proportion was significantly higher at 55%. Four of the six appeal cases were decisions to return. 
Three of these were upheld on appeal, the fourth ended in a judicial refusal. The other two appeal 
cases were decisions refusing return. Both of these were upheld on appeal. We have information 
on timing for two of the three judicial returns at appellate level. These were both decided 
relatively quickly, that is in 43 and 75 days respectively. This compares favourably with a global 
average of 208 days. The three judicial refusals on appeal took an average of 268 days from 
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application to final conclusion. Globally, judicial refusals on appeal took an average of 176 days. 
Consequently, judicial return cases to Israel were determined considerably quicker than the global 
average, while judicial refusals were considerably slower, albeit that there were only a small 
number of cases. 
 
7.2 INCOMING APPLICATIONS FOR ACCESS 
 
7.2.1 THE CONTRACTING STATES WHICH MADE THE APPLICATIONS 
 
There were just two access applications received in 1999 (compared with 19 return applications), 
one from Germany and one from Sweden. Interestingly, neither of these States made return 
applications to Israel in the same year. At 2 out of a total of 21 incoming applications made to 
Israel in 1999 the proportion of access applications was below the global norm of 17% at 10% of 
all applications received. 
 
7.2.2 THE OUTCOMES OF THE APPLICATIONS 
 
Both of the incoming access applications were withdrawn, compared with the global mean of 
26%. 
 
7.2.3 THE TIME BETWEEN APPLICATION AND FINAL CONCLUSION 
 
Both the access cases were withdrawn and therefore timing was not stated. 
 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In many respects Israel has implemented the Convention effectively. Certainly, for the most part, 
Israel complies with the recommendations as to good practice contained in the Guide to Good 
Practice on Central Authority Practice and Implementing Measures recently produced by the 
Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference.115 The Central Authority operates efficiently and 
effectively. It will accept applications in English, French and Hebrew and provides information 
and advice on its web site (currently this is only in Hebrew, but is in the process of being 
translated into English). The Central Authority seeks to encourage voluntary settlements to the 
extent of sending the abductor a “voluntary return” letter in cases where the left-behind parent 
consents. Although, when compared with the global position, the proportion of voluntary returns, 
according to the 1999 Statistical Survey,116 are relatively low,117 the 2002 statistics, provided by 
the Israeli Central Authority paint a more favourable picture.118 
 Although the Central Authority does not itself take applications to court, it clearly explains to 
applicants that they need to instruct a lawyer and provides a list of those who have experience of 
Hague Convention cases.119 Once a lawyer has been appointed the Central Authority tracks the 
progress of the case and tries to prevent delays by, for example, contacting a judge who has not 
scheduled a hearing within the stipulated time (see below). It is also on hand to smooth any 
difficulties that might delay a child’s return as, for example, to help to obtain visas for the 
defendant to enable him or her to travel back with the child. Furthermore, where necessary it will 
also co-ordinate enforcement with the police and welfare authorities. For children being returned 
to Israel the Central Authority will alert the welfare authorities if there are any child protection 
issues and, in cases where problems are contemplated will, where possible, make arrangements 
to have the parties monitored or accompanied during a stop-over on a return journey. 
 Although Israel has made a reservation to Article 26, provided applicants qualify for legal aid 
in their own country they will be entitled to legal aid in Israel. This is an interesting way of 
dealing with this issue. It means, for example, that most USA applicants, for example, will not be 
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granted legal aid, since it is generally unavailable in their own country. In no event, however, will 
a court fee or execution of judgment fee be charged. 
 Although jurisdiction to hear 1980 Hague Convention applications is vested in the lowest 
court tier, that is the Family Court rather than the District Court, it nevertheless is a specialist 
court and as Israel is a small country there are only ten such courts staffed by approximately 30 
judges. Furthermore, in practice in some districts, certain judges are more likely than others to 
hear such cases both at first instance and appellate level.120 Consequently, the de facto practice is 
to confine jurisdiction to a relatively small number of judges. However, the position would be 
further improved by standardisation of the practice of assigning Hague Convention cases to a 
particular judge or two in each court. One worrying feature of the system is the relative ease and 
consequential frequency of appeals. Over half of return applications made in 1999 went on 
appeal.121 
 Another matter of concern is, at any rate according to the 1999 Statistical Survey,122 the 
relatively low proportion of return applications ending in the child’s return, 43% compared with a 
global rate of 50% and a relatively high proportion of judicial refusals to return, 26% compared 
with the global average of 11%, (45% of those going to court, compared with 24% globally). Of 
course, the 1999 survey only provides a “snap shot” of one year and may not be typical. 
Certainly, recent case-law123 has emphasised the high burden of proof lying on those raising the 
exceptions under Articles 13 or 20 and the 2002 statistics124 do suggest some improvement 
inasmuch as of the cases resolved (four cases were still pending at the time of collection of the 
statistics) there was no judicial refusal and five judicial returns. 
 So far as disposal times are concerned the Israeli system itself provides for tight deadlines – 
hearings should take place within 15 days of the submission of the application to the court125 and 
appeals should be submitted within 7 days of the decision and heard within 10 days with the 
decision given no later than 30 days after such date. 126 Moreover, the Central Authority will track 
an application and enquire of the judge if the deadline is not met. Furthermore, in a further effort 
to minimise delay, oral evidence is limited. 127 To some extent the 1999 statistics bears witness to 
the fruit of these endeavours since, at any rate, where a return is ordered the system works 
relatively quickly, faster than the global average, 76 days as opposed to 107 days, but still falling 
short of the six week ideal. On the other hand, when return applications are refused the system 
works slowly. In part this is because where Article 13(b) (grave risk of harm) or the child’s 
objection exception is raised the court will order an expert opinion of a psychologist or 
psychiatrist and will also hear the child and in part because of the frequency of appeals. To what 
extent proceedings can be speeded up in contested cases perhaps represents the greatest challenge 
to the Israeli system. Consequently, it is to be hoped that discussions currently being held 
between the Central Authority and other relevant bodies and individuals on how to further 
expedite proceedings and ensure compliance with the time deadlines in Hague Convention cases, 
inter alia by making changes to the regulations, will bear fruit. 
 
 
9. SUMMARY OF CONCERNS 
 
• According to the 1999 statistics the overall return rate is below the global average and there is 
a significantly higher proportion of judicial refusals to return.128 
• There is a high proportion of appeals in return applications. 
• According to the 1999 statistics judicial refusals to return are disposed of relatively slowly. 
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10. SUMMARY OF GOOD PRACTICES 
 
• The Central Authority is efficient in handling child abduction cases and will accept 
applications made in English, French or Hebrew. 
• There is information and advice (currently in Hebrew but soon to be in English as well) on 
the Central Authority web site. 
• Following the appointment of a lawyer, the Central Authority tracks the progress of the case 
and will contact a judge where a hearing is not fixed within the stipulated time. 
• Where necessary, the Central Authority will co-ordinate enforcement with the police and 
welfare agencies. 
• For children being returned to Israel the Central Authority will alert the welfare authorities if 
there are child protection issues. 
• As of 1 January 2005 Israel has accepted accessions of all Contracting States (save the 
Dominican Republic which only acceded on 1 November 2004). 
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APPENDIX 
 
As at 1 January 2005, the Convention is in force between the following 73 Contracting States and 
Israel. 
 
Contracting State Entry into Force  
ARGENTINA 1 DECEMBER 1991 
AUSTRALIA 1 DECEMBER 1991 
AUSTRIA 1 DECEMBER 1991 
BAHAMAS 1 JANUARY 1996 
BELARUS 1 JUNE 1998 
BELGIUM 1 MAY 1999 
BELIZE 1 FEBRUARY 1992 
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 1 DECEMBER 1991 
BRAZIL 1 APRIL 2000 
BULGARIA 1 JANUARY 2004 
BURKINA FASO  1 NOVEMBER 1993 
CANADA 1 DECEMBER 1991 
CHILE  1 JANUARY 1996 
CHINA-HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION 1 SEPTEMBER 1997 
CHINA-MACAO SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION 1 MARCH 1999 
COLOMBIA 1 JUNE 1996 
COSTA RICA 1 APRIL 1999 
CROATIA 1 DECEMBER 1991 
CYPRUS 1 JANUARY 1996 
CZECH REPUBLIC 1 MARCH 1998 
DENMARK  1 DECEMBER 1991 
ECUADOR 1 JUNE 1992 
EL SALVADOR 1 APRIL 2002 
ESTONIA 1 APRIL 2002 
FIJI 1 OCTOBER 1999 
FINLAND 1 AUGUST 1994 
FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA 1 DECEMBER 1991 
FRANCE 1 DECEMBER 1991 
GEORGIA 1 DECEMBER 1997 
GERMANY 1 DECEMBER 1991 
GREECE 1 JUNE 1993 
GUATEMALA 1 AUGUST 2002 
HONDURAS 1 JANUARY 1996 
HUNGARY 1 FEBRUARY 1992 
ICELAND 1 FEBRUARY 1997 
IRELAND 1 DECEMBER 1991 
ITALY 1 MAY 1995 
LATVIA 1 AUGUST 2002 
LITHUANIA 1 NOVEMBER 2003 
LUXEMBOURG 1 DECEMBER 1991 
 MALTA 1 APRIL 2000 
MAURITIUS 1 DECEMBER 1993 
MEXICO 1 FEBRUARY 1992 
REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA 1 SEPTEMBER 1998 
MONACO 1 NOVEMBER 1993 
NETHERLANDS 1 DECEMBER 1991 
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NEW ZEALAND 1 FEBRUARY 1992 
NICARAGUA 1 APRIL 2002 
NORWAY 1 DECEMBER 1991 
PANAMA 1 JANUARY 1996 
PARAGUAY 1 OCTOBER 1998 
PERU 1 AUGUST 2002 
POLAND 1 NOVEMBER 1993 
PORTUGAL 1 DECEMBER 1991 
ROMANIA 1 NOVEMBER1993 
SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS  1 JANUARY 1996 
SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO 1 DECEMBER 1991 
SLOVAK REPUBLIC  1 FEBRUARY 2001 
SLOVENIA  1 JANUARY 1996 
SOUTH AFRICA 1 DECEMBER 1997 
SPAIN 1 DECEMBER 1991 
SRI LANKA 1 AUGUST 2002 
SWEDEN 1 DECEMBER 1991 
SWITZERLAND 1 DECEMBER 1991 
THAILAND 1 NOVEMBER 2003 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 1 AUGUST 2002 
TURKEY  1 JULY 2000 
TURKMENISTAN 1 JUNE 1998 
UNITED KINGDOM  1 DECEMBER 1991 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1 DECEMBER 1991 
URUGUAY 1 APRIL 2000 
UZBEKISTAN 1 OCTOBER 1999 
VENEZUELA 1 JANUARY 1997 
ZIMBABWE 1 OCTOBER 1997 
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1 The continuing influence of English law after 1948 is due not only to the fact that most of the legal institutions created 
during the Mandate continued to operate in more or less the same form, but also to the fact that Israeli judges were 
enjoined by art. 46 of the Palestine Order in Council of 1922 (whose provision remained in force unless and until 
expressly abolished by Israeli legislation) to fill all lacunae in accordance with “the substance of the common law and 
doctrines of equity in force in England.” This section was abolished by the Foundations of Law statute of 1980, the first 
section of which provides “Where the court, faced with a legal question requiring decision, finds no answer to it in 
statute law or case law or by analogy, it shall decide it in light of the principles of freedom, justice, equity and peace of 
Israel’s heritage.” Whilst this section has clearly reduced dependence on foreign law, sources from other legal systems 
may have persuasive value. (See Y. Shachar, “History and Sources of Israeli Law” in Introduction to the Law of Israel 
(A. Shapira (ed) and K.C. Dewitt-Arar (ed) Kluwer, 1995, pp. 6-7)).
2 As in English law, administrative law has been developed by judicial decision. 
3 See post at 2.2. 
4 H.C. 6056/93 Eden v Eden 51(4) P.D. 197, (hereafter ‘Eden v Eden’). 
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5 The Basic Law: The Judicature, 38 L.S.I. 101 (1983-1984), s 20 (b) provides: “A rule laid down by the Supreme Court 
shall bind any court other than the Supreme Court”.
 
6 Miscellaneous Civil Application 1648/92 Turner v Meshulam P.D. 46(3) 38. 
7 The Order in relation to Legal Arrangements (No. 2) 1967. Further to the Oslo Accords, the 
local courts in Areas A and B of the Occupied Territories apply the law existing in 1967 subject
to amendments made by the Palestinian Legislative Council.
8 Eden v Eden, op. cit., n. 4. 
9 Civil Procedure (Service of Documents on the Occupied Territories) Regulations 1969. 
10 Family Application 4330/01 Plonit v Almonit (not published) (hereafter ‘Plonit v Almonit’). 
11 Israel’s ratification took effect on the same day as those of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia 
and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro. See generally 
http://www.hcch.net
12 S.H. 148 (1991). Under Israeli law, implementing legislation is required to give effect to International Conventions 
which have been signed and ratified by the Government. 
13 In particular, there have been cases where children have been abducted to Russia and it has not been possible to 
secure their return. This information was received in May 2003 from the lawyers working at the Israeli Central 
Authority. 
14 H.C.J. 405/83 Kebly v Kebly P.D. 37(4) 705. 
15 The decision of the court is based on the welfare of the child. Thus, for example, in the case of Application for Leave 
to Appeal 225/00 Ferach v Ferach (not published), where the father refused to return the children to the mother, who 
had temporary custody, after visitation the majority of the District Court (allowing the father’s appeal from the Family 
Court) held that in the light of the evidence it would be in the children’s interests to remain with the father pending the 
decision in relation to permanent custody. Whilst the court noted that the father had taken the law into his own hands, 
this was mitigated by the fact that he applied to the court within a short time requesting temporary custody and the fact 
that the children had not wanted to return to their mother. One judge expressly pointed out that the position in the 
present case was different from that in relation to international abductions and that the rules of the 1980 Hague 
Convention were not relevant, even by way of analogy, to the present case.
16 Under s.373 of the Penal Law (as amended in Amendment no. 12, 34 L.S.I 125 (1979 – 1980). See discussion post at 
5.1.2. 
17 One works exclusively on Hague Convention cases, but the second attorney also deals with other international legal 
matters. 
18 For example, in the case of H.C.J 4365/97 Tur Sinai v the Foreign Minister and others 53(3) P.D. 673 the father, 
whose daughter was not returned by the Spanish courts (under Article 20 of the 1980 Hague Convention) as a result of 
the false evidence about the content of Israeli law given by the Israeli consul in Spain (who was the mother’s uncle) in 
an unauthorised opinion, petitioned the High Court of Justice requesting an order mandating the Foreign and Justice 
Ministers to take administrative and diplomatic action in order to promote his claims for the return of his daughter and 
the right to visit her in Spain. The court, whilst displaying great sympathy for the father and strongly condemning the 
unforeseeable outrageous and shameful behaviour of the consul (who had since resigned), found that there were no 
further actions that the Ministries in question could be expected to take at that stage. The court emphasised that the 
Central Authority had made every possible effort to help the father including urging the Spanish courts to reconsider 
and that the ultimate fault lay with the Spanish courts which had unjustifiably refused to allow an appeal in the case 
after the truth about the evidence became known. 
19 This section was amended by the Family Courts Law 1995 S.H., which created the Family Courts. Previously the 
authorised court was the District Court (the Mehozi Court). 
20 There is no formal provision for judges who specialise in Hague cases, but in some Family Courts, there is a 
particular judge or small number of judges who are assigned to hear all the Hague cases. 
21 Reg. 295B. 
22 Reg. 258C(c). However, where there is no court with local jurisdiction because the child is situated in the Occupied 
Territories, the appropriate court in Jerusalem has residual jurisdiction by virtue of reg. 6 of the Civil Procedure 
Regulations (see Eden v Eden, op. cit., n. 4). 
23 There are five District Courts: Tel-Aviv, Jerusalem, Beersheba, Haifa and Nazareth. There are around 100 District 
Court judges. 
24 In some districts, the practice is to assign one judge to all Hague Cases. 
25 Courts Law (consolidated version), 38 L.S.I 271 (1983 – 1984), s.41. 
26 Leave for Criminal Appeal 1245/93 Shterkmo v The State of Israel P.D. 47(2) 177. 
27 There are 14 judges in the Supreme Court. The President of the Supreme Court has discretion to increase the size of 
the bench, but this is rarely done. 
28 Courts Law (consolidated version), s.30 (hereafter ‘Courts Law’). 
29 The information in this section was obtained either from the Replies to the Questionnaire Concerning the Practical 
Operation of the Convention and Views on Possible Recommendations sent to the Permanent Bureau (made available 
to the authors of this Report by the Israeli Central Authority in November 2003) or from conversations between 
November 2003 and March 2004 with the lawyers working at the Israeli Central Authority.
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30 Cf when applying to court, see post at 3.5. 
31 For example, in the case of Plonit v Almoni, op. cit., n. 10, the Central Authority was asked 
to give its opinion on the application of the Convention to children in the Occupied Territories. 
32 An internal directive requires the court management to inform the Central Authority of such 
an application.
33 http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=24 
34 Section 2 of the Law. 
35 Civil Procedure Regulations, reg 295O. This applies also in relation to an appeal, Civil Appeal 2764/92 Cohen v 
Cohen, Dinim Elyon 28, 352. 
36 Leave for Appeal 1429/96 Isik v Isik (not published) (hereafter ‘Isik v Isik’). 
37 Reg. 295P. 
38 Reg. 295C(a)(b). The required form is Form 34 (which appears in the First Schedule to the Civil Procedure 
Regulations). 
39 Reg. 295C(b). 
40 Reg 295Q. 
41 Reg. 295R. 
42 Reg. 295C(d). 
43 Reg. 295E. 
44 In Civil Application 6374/94 Kalmutz v Kalmutz, the court ordered emergency measures including publication in 
newspapers and checking the abductor’s bank accounts. 
45 Reg. 295H. 
46 Reg 295G. 
47 Reg. 295I(a). 
48 Ibid. 
49 Reg 295I(b). 
50 Reg 295I(d). 
51 Civil Application 1403/94 Plonit v Almoni, P.M. 5756(2) 315. 
52 Family Application 44240/02 Bournstein v Bournstein (not published). 
53 Civil Application 2214/94 Luria v Luria (not published). 
54 Family Application 8003/98 R v R (not published). 
55 Reg 295K9(a). Account will be taken of the foreign decision even if it does not fulfill the criteria for recognition of 
foreign decisions under s.11 of the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Law 
1958 (reg. 295S).
56 See, for example, the case of Family Application 022073/01 D.Y. v D.R. (not published) where the New York judge’s 
reply to an Article 15 request simply stated that there had been a breach of the noncustodial father’s visitation rights, 
without addressing the issue of whether under New York law the mother had the right to change the child’s residence 
without the father’s consent. Thus, the Israeli judge held that the father had not satisfied the burden of proving that 
there had been a wrongful removal. The Israeli courts have held that that where the left-behind parent has an express 
right of veto on removing the child from the country of habitual residence, he or she is to be treated as having rights of 
custody. See, for example, Israel Civil Miscellaneous Request 5271/92 Foxman v. Foxman (unreported) adopting the 
approach in the English case, C v C (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [1989] 1 WLR 654. 
57 For example, Family Application 56083/96 K v L (not published) and Civil Application 1192/95 Sapir v Sapir (not 
published). 
58 For example, Family Application 26930/97 Plonit v Almonit, op. cit., n. 10. 
59 Miscellaneous Civil Application 9163/96 Hori v Bergstrum, tak-elyon 96(4) 95. 
60 Reg 295K9(b). 
61 The leading authorities are C.A. 4391/96, Roe v. Roe, 50(5) P.D. 338 (Article 13(1)(b)) and Leave for Civil Appeal 
3052/99 A.Sh. v. D.Sh. (unreported) (Article 13(2)). For criticism of both of these cases, see R. Schuz, “The Hague 
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